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INTEGRITY TESTS: DO THEY HAVE
ANY INTEGRITY?
INTRODUCTION
Job applicants are usually not surprised when a potential employer
asks questions or requires that they take a test as part of the application
process. The applicants probably assume that most of the questions or
tests are related to the individual job. Employers routinely test skills for
certain positions, such as administering typing tests to secretarial appli-
cants. Suppose, however, that the application process did not end with
the interview or test. What if applicants were followed home to see how
neatly they kept their houses? What if employers went to church to
check on attendance, or followed applicants into the voting booth, or
into the bedroom? This type of behavior would be a flagrant invasion of
privacy, but what if employers justified this invasion by their need to
evaluate job applicants' character? Employers might claim that those
employees who go to church are hard-working, those who are neat at
home are neat at work, those who vote are well-adjusted members of
society, and those who are sexually "normal" have good relationships
with co-workers. Would these explanations justify this kind of
surveillance?
This scenario is not as fanciful as it appears. Henry Ford used to
send caseworkers to employees' homes to check up on their alcohol con-
sumption, sex lives, and cleanliness.' Certain job applications required
applicants to "name their political leader, and if they smoked, gambled,
swore, used slang, or had ever been divorced."'2 Modem mores do not
allow such overt intrusions into applicants' or employees' lives; how-
ever, many employers routinely circumvent this proscription by using
questions to find out about similar aspects of applicants' private lives.
These questions make up what are known as honesty or integrity tests,
and their use is widespread and growing.
Currently integrity tests are subject to little or no regulation. This
note argues that regulation is needed. Part I introduces sample questions
and outlines the rise in employer use of integrity testing as a pre-screen-
ing tool. Part II outlines the legal status of integrity testing, examining
both statutory and common law. Parts I and IV analyze the potential
harms and benefits of using integrity testing. Part V describes and criti-
1 David F. Linowes & Ray Spencer, Privacy: Workplace Issues of the 90s, 23 J. MAR-
SHALL L. Rv. 591, 597-98 (1990).
2 Id. at 597-98.
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cizes the prevalent policy of not taking affirmative action regarding in-
tegrity testing, on the grounds that it places the burden of production on
the party least able to do so. Finally, part VI offers recommendations
that could shift this burden and encourage further study of integrity test-
ing which would allow for more informed policy decisions.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Integrity tests typically consist of a combination of yes/no, true/
false, or multiple choice questions.3 They are designed to evaluate the
taker's propensity towards honesty, theft, productivity, and compatibility
with others. 4 The tests assume that people's tendencies or inclinations
translate into actual behavior. The tests use the presence or absence of
certain traits to predict which test-takers are likely to be honest or dis-
honest. The publishers realize that the test-takers might be tempted to
answer the way they think the employer wants them to; therefore, pub-
lishers employ a wide range of question types, from overt questions to
veiled-purpose questions. In overt questions, the question concerns a
work-related trait, and the response the employer wants is obvious:5
How honest are you?
How prompt are you?
Have you ever stolen anything from an employer?
6
In veiled-purpose questions, the question appears unrelated to job
performance, and there is no obviously correct or preferred answer.
Do you feel guilty when you do something you should not do?7
Do you make your bed?
How often are you embarrassed?
You love to take chances-True or False? 8
Some tests feature questions that delve into sensitive and personal
subjects such as religion and sexuality. While the preferred answer is
sometimes clear, there is no obvious relation to job performance.
I go to church almost every week.
I believe there is a God.
I wish I were not bothered by thoughts about sex.
3 David C. Yamada, The Regulation of Pre-Employment Honesty Testing: Striking a
Temporary (?) Balance Between Self-Regulation and Prohibition, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1549,
1550 (1993).
4 Id.
5 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Use of Integrity Tests for Pre-
Employment Screening, OTA-SET-442. 1 (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, September 1990) [hereinafter OTA].
6 Id. at 1.
7 Michael B. Metzger, "Just Say No" to Integrity Testing, 4 U. FLA. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y
9, n.2 (1991).
8 OTA, supra note 5, at 2.
[Vol. 6:211
INTEGRITY TESTS
I like to talk about sex.
I have never indulged in any unusual sex practices. 9
While applicants might find these questions bewildering, they prob-
ably do not suspect that their responses will be used to measure their
honesty or propensity for undesirable behavior. Applicants also may not
realize that a below average score can automatically disqualify them
from the job, regardless of how well they performed in other phases of
the job screening process.
Psychological testing for employment purposes has existed since the
early 1900s,10 but its use has become widespread since Congress banned
lie detector or polygraph tests." The number of people subject to integ-
rity tests nationwide is significant. Between 5,00012 and 6,00013 em-
ployers use integrity tests in evaluating applicants; the actual number of
tests given ranges from 2.514 to 5 million.' 5 Wholesale and retail compa-
nies commonly use integrity tests to screen employees, 16 as do busi-
nesses whose "employees have access to cash or merchandise, such as
retail stores, financial institutions, and warehouse operations."'17 Integ-
rity tests are "overwhelmingly given to individuals applying for low level
positions."18
II. THE CURRENT LAW
A. FEDERAL LAW
Numerous employers turned to integrity tests to fill in the gap left
by the federal ban on polygraph testing. The polygraph was one of the
most controversial tools employers used to gather information and pre-
9 Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal Rptr. 2d 77, 79-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (dis-
cussing the questions featured on the Psychscreen pre-employment integrity test).
10 Kimberli R. Black, Personality Screening in Employment, 32 AM. Bus L. J. 69, 71
(1994).
11 Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994).
12 Kurt H. Decker, Honesty Tests - A New Form of Polygraph? 4 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J.
141, 145 (1986) (citing Sackett, Honest Testing for Personnel Selection, 30 Personnel Admin.
67 (1985)); Metzger, supra note 7, at 10 (citing Focus on... "Integrity" Tests, Indiv. Empl.
Rts. (BNA) No. 18, at 4 (Oct. 9, 1990)).
13 Metzger, supra note 7, at 10 (citing Focus on... "Integrity" Tests, Indiv. Empl. Rts.
(BNA) No. 11, at 4 (March 26, 1991)).
14 Id. (citing Ed Bean, More Firms Use Attitude Tests to Keep Thieves Off the Payroll,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1987, at 41, col. 3).
'5 Id. (citing Tim Beardsley, Mind Reader: Do Personality Tests Pick Out Bad Apples?,
26 Sci. AM. 154 (1991)).
16 Id. at 5 (citing Jerry Beilenson, Applicant Screening Methods: Under Surveillance, 67
PERsoNNEL 3 (1990)).
17 Decker, supra note 12, at 144 (quoting Sackett, Honest Testing for Personnel Selec-
tion, 30 PERSONNEL AMDnN. 67 (1985)).
18 George Hanson, Note, To Catch a Thief: The Legal and Policy Implications of Hon-
esty Testing in the Workplace, 9 LAW & INEQ. J. 497, 525 (1991).
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dict behavior. Congress passed the Polygraph Protection Act of 198819
in response to concerns about privacy, security of results, reliability, and
misuse.20 The Act denied "most private employers the use of the poly-
graph as a pre-employment screening device." 2' However, the Act did
not explicitly include integrity tests in its statutory ban,22 and there is no
case law finding them to be within the Act's reach. "[N]o Federal
agency ... comprehensively regulates or monitors the field of honesty
testing, and there is no federal statute that specifically applies to honesty
testing. '2
3
Integrity tests do not appear to be illegal under the federal Constitu-
tion, insofar as there has been no Supreme Court case "implicating psy-
chological, aptitude, or honesty testing."24 The Constitution only offers
protection against intrusive state questions where state action is impli-
cated.25 Even when state action is implicated, invasions of privacy can
withstand constitutional challenge when the government advances a
compelling interest to justify the intrusion.26 A constitutional privacy
claim is useless against the thousands of private employers who use in-
tegrity tests.27 Further, the Supreme Court's "right to privacy cases" are
difficult to apply in this context because they concern intrusion into spe-
cific rights, such as procreation.2 8 "Although the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized a right to privacy, legislatures and courts have not extended this
right to prohibit personality testing by public employers.
2 9
B. STATE LAW
Statutory bans against integrity tests exist in two states, Rhode Is-
land and Massachusetts; these states include integrity tests in their defini-
tion of lie detector tests.30 Oregon considered doing the same, but
19 Employee Polygaph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994).
20 Metzger, supra note 7, at 17-18.
21 Id. at 18.
22 29 U.S.C. § 20001(3) (1994).
23 Yamada, supra note 3, at 1552.
24 Black, supra note 10, at 91.
25 Id. at 92 (citing McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1381 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'd,
601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979)). See also Donald H.J. Hermann, III, Privacy, The Prospective
Employee, and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph & Personality Testing,
47 WASH. L. REv. 73 (1971).
26 Black, supra note 10, at 91.
27 R.M. O'BANNON, ET AL., HoNESTy & INTEGRITY TESTING: A PRACTICAL GuIDE, 22-
23 (Applied Information Resources 1989) [hereinafter O'Bannon].
28 Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), reh. denied, 410 U.S. 959; Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), reh. denied, 478 U.S.
1039.
29 Black, supra note 10, at 92.




abandoned the bill .because of limited information about the tests.31 A
Minnesota court refused to include integrity tests within the statutory
definition of lie detector test absent express legislative intent. 32 Other
state courts and legislatures have yet to determine whether their state
bans on polygraph tests also include integrity tests.
Some state constitutions explicitly protect their citizens' privacy.
33
Furthermore, some state labor codes extend protection to political
activities of employees.3 4 However, these sources of law only serve to
prevent particular questions and are not a means of striking down integ-
rity tests altogether. California's constitution and labor code have been
the focus of the two leading cases challenging integrity tests, Soroka v.
Dayton Hudson35 and Thompson v. Borg-Warner Protective Services
Corporation.
36
C. THE CALIFORNIA CASES
California's constitution states that "All people are by nature free
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are... pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy. '37 In addi-
tion, sections 1101 and 1102 of the California Labor Code prevent an
employer from influencing, interfering in, or discriminating on the basis
of their employees' political activities.
38
In Soroka v. Dayton Hudson, a California court held that the Psych-
screen, an integrity test used by Target Stores, violated both the state
"constitutional right to privacy and [the state] statutory prohibitions
against improper preemployment inquiries and discriminatory conduct
by inquiring into its applicants' religious beliefs and sexual orienta-
-tion."'39 Target had used the Psychscreen to evaluate applicants for the
position of security officer. The plaintiffs in Soroka were three appli-
cants who had been offended by the test questions. Of the three, only
one, Sibi Soroka, was hired. After exhausting the appropriate adminis-
trative remedies, the plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that "the test asked
invasive questions that were not job-related."40 When the lower court
31 Comment, Prohibition of Pencil and Paper Honesty Tests: Is Honesty the Best Pol-
icy?, 25 WmLAmEr L. Ray. 571, 594 n.119 (1989).
32 Minnesota v. Century Camera, 309 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1981).
33 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; Amiz. CONST. art. I, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5;
MONT. CONsT. art. 1, § 10; S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
34 See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1101 & 1102 (West 1996).
35 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (1993).
36 1996 WL 162990 (N.D. Cal. March 11, 1996).
37 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
38 CAL. LAB. CODE. §§ 1101 & 1102 (West 1996).
39 Soroka, I Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89.
40 Id. at 80.
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refused to issue a preliminary injunction against the use of the Psych-
screen, the plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the test violated the Califor-
nia constitutional right to privacy and the California Labor Code.
The appeals court considered whether the Psychscreen tested for
"honesty" or some other quality or characteristic. The court found that
questions such as "I believe in the second coming of Christ" and "I feel
sure that there is only one true religion" inquired into applicants' reli-
gious beliefs.41 The appeals court found that a question such as "I am
very strongly attracted to members of my own sex" intentionally inquired
into applicants' sexual orientation.42 Target's test rated this response in
its socialization trait category which measured individuals' identification
with traditional morals as an indication of their propensity to act accord-
ing to society's rules. The court said that "[p]ersons who identify them-
selves as homosexuals may be stigmatized as 'willing to defy or violate'
their norms, which may in turn result in an invalid test. As a matter of
law, this practice tends to discriminate against those who express a ho-
mosexual orientation."
43
The court found that the religious belief and sexual orientation ques-
tions violated the privacy clause of the California constitution. 44 The
court first noted that the privacy rights of applicants were indistinguish-
able from those of employees.45 The court went on to state that an em-
ployer must show a compelling interest and a job-related purpose to
justify any invasions of privacy. 46 The court found that Target's interest
in emotionally stable employees did not justify questions about religious
beliefs or sexual orientation, because Target had failed to show that "a
person's religious beliefs or sexual orientation have any bearing on the
emotional stability or on the ability to perform a [store security officer's]
job responsibilities." 47
The Soroka court also found that the questions inquiring into the
applicant's sexual orientation violated the California Labor Code,
48
which guarantees employees' right to be free from employer coercion or
intimidation based on political activities.49 Under California case law,
the "struggle of the homosexual community for equal rights, particularly
in the field of employment, must be recognized as a political activity."
50
41 Id. at 79.
42 Id. at 88.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 85.
45 Id. at 83.
46 Id. at 86.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 88.
49 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1996).
50 Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 487 (Cal. 1979).
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Thus, under Labor Code section 1101, discrimination against an em-
ployee on the basis of sexual orientation is illegal. Under section 1102,
using a threat of loss of employment to coerce employees to refrain from
expressing their sexual orientation is also illegal.5 1
The Soroka court's interpretation of the California Labor Code pro-
vides the basis for a case pending in the California courts. In Thompson
v. Borg-Warner, the employee Thompson's cause of action survived the
employer's motion for summary judgment.52 When Thompson applied
for a job as a security guard, Borg-Warner required that he complete a
multiple choice test, the PASS-Il D.A.T.A. Survey. Thompson alleges
that when he returned the completed test to the employer with question
marks next to several of the answers, he was told that the marks were
"wrong" and would make the possibility of employment with Borg-
Warner unlikely.
5 3
The test asked questions about applicants' views on drug use.54 The
court found views on legalization of drugs to be controversial and polit-
ical; a reasonable jury could find that using such questions "to evaluate
the suitability of applicants ... tends to influence, control, or direct the
political activities of the applicant pool" and violates the California La-
bor Code.5 5 Therefore, the court denied Borg-Warner's motion for sum-
mary judgment.5 6 Thompson's lawyer contends:
Borg-Warner has come up with a test that discriminates
against people who obviously come from a particular
political orientation without directly asking about party
affiliations... [o]ne third of the one hundred questions
on Borg-Warner's pre-employment test deal with one's
views about corporations and employers. These ques-
tions are graded on an "alienation index," which tells the
employer whether someone has traditional or countercul-
tural values.57
Neither Soroka nor Thompson make integrity testing per se illegal.
Soroka was settled out of court and Thompson is pending. In addition,
the courts reasoned that certain questions violated the applicant's right to
privacy as well as statutory protections, but they did not go so far as to
say that all integrity tests would do so. Although these cases indicate
51 Soroka, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 88.
52 Thompson v. Borg-Warner Protective Serv. Corp., 1996 WL 162990 (N.D. Cal.
March 12, 1996).
53 Id. at *2.
54 Id. at *9.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Nina Schuyler, Politics Make Strange Hiring Practices, CAL. LAW., Mar. 15, 1995, at
1996]
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that California courts are willing to entertain suits challenging integrity
tests, the courts have not definitively decided the tests' legality. While
both cases represent a job applicant's first steps in challenging the legal-
ity of certain integrity tests, their ultimate significance in the overall de-
bate remains to be seen.
III. POTENTIAL HARMS OF PRE-EMPLOYMENT INTEGRITY
TESTING
Unless employers or publishers can prove that integrity tests accu-
rately measure honesty and identify individuals likely to steal, they may
unfairly eliminate people from the job selection process. Furthermore,
the tests may disadvantage members of a protected class and run afoul of
employee protections under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.58
Integrity tests may overinclude honest people in the dishonest classifica-
tion. If test results are shared with persons inside or outside the business,
applicants may be stigmatized. Finally, the tests may offend people in
much the same way as the now illegal polygraph test.
A. INTEGRITY TESTS MAY NOT BE ACCURATE
Employers have a legitimate interest in hiring honest workers. Any
test administered with the purpose of identifying honest job applicants is
job-related and reasonable, as long as the test does not run afoul of em-
ployees' legally protected rights. However, if the tests do not measure
honesty, then it is not possible to justify their use as job-related. Integ-
rity tests may actually measure other qualities, such as test-takers' will-
ingness to judge and punish others, and label those test-takers dishonest.
Therefore, the first inquiry is whether integrity tests do in fact measure
what they purport to measure, i.e., honesty.
An analysis of one exam found that the test measured four factors:
self-punitiveness, punitiveness towards others, self-projection, and pro-
jection toward others.5 9 On this exam, answers that showed the taker's
willingness to give others a second chance resulted in a lower honesty
score.60 This correlation is spurious; there is no necessary connection
between unwillingness to judge others and honesty. A Minnesota nun
failed an honesty test because she based her answers on her belief that
Christianity espouses forgiveness. 61 Two integrity test critics claim that
58 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.
59 O'BANNON, supra note 27, at 22-23.
60 Yamada, supra note 3, at 9.
61 Hanson, supra note 18, at 504.
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they have found that open-minded people consistently fail honesty
tests.6
2
Employers quickly counter that they are not required to show busi-
ness necessity or job-relatedness for their employment practices. If in-
tegrity tests inaccurately label some honest people as dishonest, the pool
of applicants is reduced, but the employer ultimately suffers no harm.
Employers must only justify a hiring practice if a court finds that this
practice violates a statute or a constitutional right; there is no duty to be
fair.
Scholars have questioned the basic premise behind honesty testing,
i.e., that there is a trait called honesty that these tests measure and use to
predict future behavior. According to an American Psychological Asso-
ciation test developer, "There's a tremendous disagreement about
whether you can even measure honesty. '63 The Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) questions the predictive value of integrity tests: "It is
at least theoretically possible for individuals to be identified as possess-
ing a trait called dishonesty without them necessarily committing theft or
other counterproductive acts in the workplace." The OTA also dis-
putes whether answers accurately gauge test-takers' past behavior and
thereby indicate propensity to engage in similar behavior in the future.
The OTA noted that whether tests are able to accomplish this "depends
in large part on whether admissions of past acts are a reasonable surro-
gate for actual past acts."
'65
Publishers argue that the tests do measure honesty. Validation stud-
ies exist that purport to statistically confirm that integrity tests identify
employees who would have been dishonest with the employer. How-
ever, most of these validation studies measure a test's ability to identify
the group of honest employees, not its ability to identify all test-takers
who are in fact liars or thieves.
The OTA task force criticized each of the various validation meth-
ods used in these studies. They found that "concurrent" validation stud-
ies comparing integrity test results with polygraph exams were
inadequate because the polygraph itself has not been proved valid.66 In
addition, "contrasted" group studies suffer because "the underlying as-
sumption that convicted felons have attitudes and lifestyles similar (in
62 Stephen J. Buastello & Mark 1. Rieke, A Review and Critique of Honesty Test Re-
search, 9 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 501, 513.
63 Christine Gorman, Honesty, Can We Trust You? Barred From Using Polygraphs, Em-
ployers Seek an Integrity Test, TIam, Jan. 23, 1989, at 44.
64 OTA, supra note 5, at 33.
65 Id. at 34.
66 Id. at 50-51.
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construct) to those of normal job applicants or employees 'who pilfer
small amounts of merchandise at work' cannot be substantiated.
'67
The APA Task Force report supported validation studies using self-
admissions and confessions and urged that the validity of integrity tests
not be measured absolutely but compared with the validities of other pro-
cedures that would inevitably be used in their stead, such as unstructured
interviews or handwriting analyses. 68 The APA's position is "that for
those few tests for which validity information is available the preponder-
ance of the evidence is supportive of their predictive validity.
'69
Although the APA and the OTA differ in their assessment of these
validation studies, both strongly emphasize the need for further in-
dependent research.70 The few validation studies that exist were con-
ducted by the publishing companies who produce the tests.7 1 The APA
report notes that "[o]ne serious problem in evaluating proprietary tests is
the realization that publishers may have no interest in making negative
information available."' 72 The OTA concluded that "[g]iven the paucity
of independent confirmation of research results ... in OTA's review of
validity studies . . the existing research is insufficient as a basis for
supporting the assertion that these tests can reliably predict dishonest be-
havior in the workplace.
'73
B. INTEGRITY TESTS ARE OVER-INCLUSIVE
Employees are concerned about test-takers who register as false-
positives. The test publishers primarily focus validation studies on the
test's ability to identify dishonest takers. The result is designed to verify
the test's ability to predict accurately that all test-takers above a certain
score will be honest employees; it is not intended to predict that all test-
takers below that score are dishonest. Thus, validation studies typically
do not attempt to measure whether integrity tests are over-inclusive,
falsely identifying some honest people with the dishonest group. The
possibility of false-positives is even more probable when the cut off
score for labeling the test-taker as honest or dishonest is arbitrarily set by
employers.
Furthermore, if the tests are as reliable as the publishers maintain, a
person who fails to make the "honesty cut" will have a similar score on
67 Id.
68 SCIENCE DIRECrORATE, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, QUESTIONNAIRES
USED IN THE PREDICTION OF TRUSTWORTHINESS IN PRE-EMPLOYMENT SELECTION PROCE-
DURES: AN A.P.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, 6-7 (1991) [hereinafter APA].
69 Id. at 26.
70 APA, supra note 68, at 22; OTA, supra note 5, at 49.
71 OTA, supra note 5, at 49.
72 APA, supra note 68, at 21.
73 OTA, supra note 5, at 10.
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subsequent tests. The effect of this systematic misclassification may
have far-reaching consequences. The OTA noted that "[if integrity tests
are reliable (in the sense that individuals' scores do not vary significantly
over time), as the test publishers claim, then their use could create a
population of persons who are repeatedly misclassified, and systemati-
cally denied employment without cause." 74
The APA Task Force report discounted the dangers of misclassifica-
tion, asserting that "any fallible selection procedure will result in poten-
tially worthy applicants being rejected. However, any valid selection
device will result in fewer false-positive errors than a random or quasi-
random procedure such as 'first come, first served." 75 Publishers point
to the simple fact that studies exist to support the validity of the tests and
the "lack of convincing evidence that such tests have an adverse impact
on female or minority applicants. '76 Although there are studies that
show that the proportion of false-positives is high, there have been no
studies that prove that in practice, those people registering as false-posi-
tives are either stigmatized or systematically denied employment
opportunities. 77
C. INTEGRITY TESTS MAY HAVE A HIDDEN ADVERSE IMPACT
Employers argue that there is no proof demonstrating that any of the
many integrity tests have an adverse impact. They base their argument in
part on publishers' claims that "honesty test scores have no adverse im-
pact on any of the protected racial/ethnic groups" if administered to all
potential job applicants.78 However, the publishers' argument suffers
from a fundamental logic fault: it is an argument ad ignoratium. Em-
ployees' failure to prove that the tests do have an adverse impact on a
protected group is not alone sufficient to prove that the tests in fact do
not have an adverse impact.
While commentators are hesitant to assert the existence of adverse
impact without any evidence, both the OTA and the APA reports stress
the publishers' responsibility to be vigilant in preventing this result.79
The latter also stress the need for more independent research and an ex-
change of information that the publishers themselves have collected re-
garding potential adverse impact.80 There is a concern that the tests
appear non-discriminatory in part because employers do not disclose that
failure to pass the cut-off score is the reason that a job is not offered.
74 Id. at 13.
75 APA, supra note 68, at 11.
76 Metzger, supra note 7, at 26.
77 APA, supra note 68, at 11.
78 Decker, supra note 12, at 145.
79 APA, supra note 68, at 14; OTA, supra note 5, at 15.
80 APA, supra note 68, at 14; OTA, supra note 5, at 14-15.
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"[T]he widespread adoption of these practices by employers essentially
precludes legitimate legal challenges to honesty testing, as most rejected
applicants will not be informed of the significance of their honesty test
results in the hiring decisions. ' 81 Most studies which claim the tests do
not have an adverse impact are proprietary and are not independently
verified. 82
The secrecy surrounding honesty tests insulates them from scru-
tiny.8 3 A business usually defends itself against a plaintiff's adverse im-
pact charge based on applicant statistics if its hiring record stays within
the 4/5ths rule.84 Under this rule there is evidence of adverse impact if
the hiring rate for a minority group is less than 80 per cent (or 4/5ths) of
the majority.8 5 Staying within the 4/5ths rule does not necessarily mean
that the tests themselves do not disadvantage members of a protected
class or unfairly stigmatize them with lower or failing test results. In
contrast to an applicant-statistics approach, a "class-statistics approach
uses characteristics of the protected class in general to establish adverse
impact. '86 A class-statistics approach may be more pertinent and re-
vealing in the evaluation of the potential discriminatory effects of integ-
rity tests.
If a test regarded certain social or cultural characteristics of test-
takers in a protected class as dishonest, the test would adversely impact
members of that class. Suppose, for example, that women taking integ-
rity tests are statistically more prone to give a person a second chance.
Some integrity tests score this as a negative characteristic. 87 In this hy-
pothetical, the tests disfavor a protected class by focusing on a class
characteristic having no rational link to dishonesty, thereby erroneously
branding a significant portion of this class dishonest. Such discrimina-
tory scoring of responses would leave employers vulnerable to an ad-
verse impact charge under Title VII. However, currently, employers tell
job applicants neither their test scores nor how much weight they accord
these scores. Without this information, applicants are left with little evi-
dence on which to base legal action.
D. BREACHES OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND STIGMATIZATION
No current law prevents an employer from disclosing integrity test
results to other employers. 88 Sharing test results saves an employer
81 Yamada, supra note 3, at 1565-66.
82 Id. at 1569.
83 Id. at 1566.
84 OTA, supra note 5, at 69.
85 Id.
86 Black, supra note 10, at 112.
87 Hanson, supra note 18, at 509-10.
88 Yamada, supra note 3, at 1567.
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money if the applicant has been tested previously. One estimate said that
"sales of pre-employment data are growing as much as 75 per cent per
year for some information companies." 89 Thus, an applicant may not
only be eliminated from the job that required the test but also from future
jobs based on that single test score. A shared database has the same
effect as systematic misclassification; however, the applicant need only
fail one test, not a number of them.
Employers argue that there is no real danger of stigmatization if the
tests are kept confidential90 and that it is in employers' best interest to do
so to avoid common law torts such as defamation. The APA Task Re-
port notes that if applicants do not know that failure of these tests was the
reason they were not hired, and if employers keep the records confiden-
tial, applicants will not feel a resulting stigma.91 This view presupposes
that employers will foresee the risk of a defamation suit and not share
information that an applicant failed a test with other employers. In addi-
tion, applicants are unlikely to bring defamation suits since they are not
told whether they failed the test, let alone that the results were shared.
Thus the employer has little reason to fear a suit and a great incentive to
minimize costs through sharing test results.
E. INTEGRITY TESTS ARE OFFENSIVE AND INTRUSIVE
One controversial aspect of the banned polygraph test was that
"such testing raised serious privacy issues regarding the questions asked
by polygraph examiners." 92 While few studies have measured partici-
pants' offense at integrity test questions, many questions are similar to
those posed in the polygraph exam. In addition, many questions "would
pose problems in any prospective job interview as unrelated to the job."
93
One study examined college graduates who had experience in in-
dustries that used honesty tests. It found that 42 per cent considered the
tests to be an invasion of their privacy, 26 per cent resented having to
take the test, and 33 per cent said that using the test gave a poor impres-
sion of the company.94 Test-takers generally are not aware of the nature
and the weight of integrity tests. The public may respond positively to
the idea of integrity tests, not knowing their content or their use. There
can be no truly representative public reaction poll to integrity tests until
people are fully informed about the issues surrounding the tests.
89 Id. at 1568.
90 APA, supra note 68, at 11.
91 Id. at 12.
92 Metzger, supra note 7, at 17.
93 Decker, supra note 12, at 145.
94 Anne Marie Yean and Paul R. Sackett, Pre-employment Honesty Testing: Fakability,
Reactions of Test Takers, and Company Image, J. Bus. & PSYCHOL., Spring 1987, at 253-54.
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Publishers are quick to point out that their tests do not provoke the
same negative reaction as the physically intimidating polygraph.95 While
the honesty test is not as physically intrusive, many of the test publish-
ers' claims are based on questions applicants answer after completing the
main test. Also, the possibility exists that applicants "who have an inter-
est in 'passing' the test and being hired are not entirely candid in their
answers."96 Furthermore, applicants' general lack of information about
the use of the tests may affect their reaction to the post-exam questions.
"An applicant may believe that his or her answers to a question or series
of questions is legitimate, but if the answers are then interpreted to make
specific conclusions about propensity for future behavior, the applicant
may feel that his or her privacy has been invaded." 97 Test-takers have no
doubt concerning the purpose of the polygraph. As long as test-takers
have no notice of the purpose of integrity tests and how their scores af-
fect their chance of being hired, there is no way to gauge test-takers' true
attitudes towards these tests.
IV. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF INTEGRITY TESTING
Employers argue that integrity tests are a tool that meet several
needs: reduction of on-the-job theft,98 efficient management of large ap-
plicant pools,99 and avoidance of potential liability under the negligent
hiring doctrine.100 The following sections examine each of these claims.
A. REDUCTION OF THEFT
One major reason for using integrity testing is the "premise that test
use will result in reduced employee theft." 01 The Department of Justice
requested a 1977 American Management Association study which esti-
mated that "employee pilfering accounted for between $5 and $10 bil-
lion."10 2 A 1991 source estimates the cost of employee theft may reach
$50 billion per year and that "intangible theft, may run upwards of $230
billion."103 Employers obviously have an interest in hiring workers who
are not likely to steal and thus contribute to these increasingly high
95 OTA, supra note 5, at 71.
96 Id. at 71-72.
97 Id. at 73.
98 APA, supra note 68, at 7.
99 OTA, supra note 5, at 3.
100 "While integrity test publishers do not necessarily claim that their instruments can
detect potentially violent or hazardous behaviors, they do suggest that firms can point to the
use of integrity tests as evidence of a broad strategy of conscientious pre-employment screen-
ing." Id.
101 APA, supra note 68, at 7.
102 OTA, supra note 5 at 20-21.
103 Metzger, supra note 7, at 13.
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losses. They want a reliable method to avoid this costly problem, and
integrity tests look like one.
However, integrity testing may not be a simple solution to this prob-
lem. Behavior may depend more on situation than on personality: "Em-
ployers seeking to improve job performance would achieve better results
by changing working conditions rather than be hiring employees with
certain personality characteristics."'104 Integrity testing is not the only
option. More cost-efficient background checks and improved training of
interview personnel could assist in improving the screening process and
combat on-the-job theft. In addition, employers could reduce theft after
hiring by implementing programs to reduce negative attitudes that con-
tribute to theft. Honesty testing may actually lull employers into a false
sense of security. They may feel that they have hired honest workers
who need little monitoring.
B. EF-crENT MANAGEMENT OF LARGE APPLICANT PooLs
Given the large number of applicants, employers desire an instru-
ment that will efficiently assess unknown candidates' qualities and quali-
fications. Integrity tests measure the elusive quality of honesty in an
apparently empirical way. Test-takers are assigned numerical scores
which can be used as a cut-off or as a means of comparing applicants.
Employers' use of integrity tests is a "manifestation of this emphasis on
'efficiency and quantitative measurement.' 1 05
Employers like integrity tests because other means of screening job
applicants appear even less satisfactory. Reference checks are futile
when past employers refuse to provide any meaningful information for
fear of defamation lawsuits. Background checks are very expensive.
The average employment interview is not reliable.106 In addition, pub-
lishers claim that the tests do not violate current anti-discrimination
laws.10 7 Employers who want to screen applicants regard the integrity
test as the best available alternative among the various choices.
While employers need effective tools to efficiently manage the large
labor pool, their needs are not met if the tool used is fundamentally
flawed. The result is merely a random simplification of the hiring pro-
cess. Simplifying hiring with a test bearing the scientific imprimatur of a
publishing company may in reality do little more than reassure employ-
ers that there is an independent basis for their decisions. If the tests ulti-
mately do not stand up to independent validation studies, then that
reassurance may be misplaced. Viewed this way, integrity tests are noth-
104 Black, supra note 10, at 82.
105 Yamada, supra note 3, at 1563.
106 APA, supra note 68, at 9.
107 Linowes & Spencer, supra note 1, at 607.
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ing more than an expensive placebo. Integrity tests are just as arbitrary
as removing every third applicant from consideration, but the latter is
much less costly and involves no stigma.
C. AVOIDING CHARGES OF NEGLIGENT HIRING
Employers wish to scrutinize job applicants not only as an aid in the
selection process but also as a defense against a potential negligent hiring
lawsuit. The negligent hiring doctrine imposes a duty of care on employ-
ers to reasonably foresee dangerous employee conduct.108 In a negligent
hiring claim, courts must determine whether the employer conducted a
"reasonable investigation into the employee's background vis-a-vis the
job for which the employee was hired and the possible risk of harm or
injury to co-workers or third parties that could result from the conduct of
an unfit employee."'10 9 Employers can fulfill their duty of care by inves-
tigating job applicants, thus avoiding liability if the employee commits a
tort against another employee or a third party. "[J]udicial scrutiny of
hiring practices serves as both an incentive for employers to consider
honesty tests and a marketing tool for test publishers."'" 0
The argument that employers will want to use honesty testing as a
preemptive defense against negligent hiring charges does not withstand
close scrutiny. First, the tests are not designed to identify the violent
behavior that often forms the basis of a negligent hiring charge. Second,
the existence of an "honest" score on an integrity test has never been
used as a defense to a negligent hiring charge."'
V. CURRENT POLICY
The debate over integrity tests has ended in a stalemate with neither
side able to prove their position. Test opponents cannot demonstrate that
the test or its effects are or should be illegal. Test proponents cannot
affirmatively show that the tests are valid and non-discriminatory. Both
critics and supporters have concluded that more information is needed
before making a final assessment." 2
Absent proof that the tests do not achieve their purpose or proof that
employees' legally protected rights are being violated, the law has not
responded to the legality of the tests. Legislators have neither drafted
new legislation to cover integrity testing nor have they included it within
108 Yamada, supra note 3, at 1563.
109 Cathy A. Shattuck, The Tort of Negligent Hiring and the Use of Selection Devices:
The Employee's Right of Privacy and the Employer's Need to Know, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 2, 2-
3 (1989).
110 Yamada, supra note 3, at 1564.
111 Id.
112 APA, supra note 68, at 21; OTA, supra note 5, at 10.
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the definition of polygraph under federal or state law. Courts are reluc-
tant to expand current legal protections to this relatively new pre-em-
ployment practice, and plaintiffs who oppose these tests find they lack
adequate evidence necessary to prove them illegal under traditional legal
theories. While the lack of legal intervention may reflect a hesitance to
formulate policy without adequate information, the effect of non-interfer-
ence is to presumptively side with test supporters.
The current law places the initial burden of persuasion upon the
party least able to gather information necessary to persuade. This makes
little sense. Although test publishers and the employers who use the tests
have slim proof that the tests are fair and legal, they need not offer any
proof at all to a court unless the plaintiff has shifted the burden onto the
employer in the way the Soroka decision suggests. Only after an em-
ployee establishes that the tests are invasive under an existing law must
an employer justify their use. Only at this point would the individual
test's validity and job-relatedness come under judicial scrutiny. Unfortu-
nately for plaintiffs, the instances where they can easily shift that burden
are rare and are highly dependent on state laws. The employer and test
publisher have the greater opportunity to use the information already in
their possession, as well as the means to conduct further studies.
The current presumption that the tests are legal until proved other-
wise gives publishers and employers no incentive to conduct further
study. If additional study supports proponents' position, then publishers
would have spent money to put themselves in the same position they are
currently in. If further study supports opponents' position, then publish-
ers will have lost a profitable market. Without independent studies, the
publishers will continue to sell the tests and employers will continue to
use them.
The current policy of inaction allows employers to use the tests in
reliance on test publishers' promises, implied or explicit, concerning the
effectiveness and validity of the tests. If the tests have not been indepen-
dently validated, this reliance may be misplaced. The only clear winner
is the test publisher whose tests will continue to be created, marketed,
and sold on the basis of their own validation studies.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
If the overriding problem in assessing the policy considerations of
approving or banning the use of integrity tests is information, then any
recommendation that presumptively decides the issue without also pro-
viding the incentive for more information will suffer from the same fail-
ing as the non-interference policy currently in place. For this reason,
state-by-state, case-by-case adjudication and simple bans are not satisfac-
tory options. Legislative notice requirements for test-takers could pro-
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vide both information as well as the incentive to conduct further studies.
Burden shifting devices under a legislative, administrative, or judicial
scheme could place the onus on the test publishers and users to affirma-
tively establish that integrity testing is valid and does not violate employ-
ees' protected rights.
A. RECOMMENDATION AGAINST STATE-BY-STATE, CASE-BY-CASE
ADJUDICATION
Case and jurisdiction specific judgments expend a great amount of
time, energy, and expense to settle small pieces of a large issue. Courts
individually focusing on narrow questions or the legality of a specific
test will not contribute to a meaningful resolution of the issue. This ap-
proach leaves employers and publishers in doubt about the legality of the
tests in general without providing a solution for employees affected by
the use of other integrity tests.
Even if states follow California's tendency to invalidate certain
types of questions, many tests do not ask questions about sex or religion.
In addition, publishers could easily delete the portions of any test that did
ask such questions. The question of employer interference in employ-
ees'/applicants' political activity is based on a specific California statute
and may have little effect outside of California. Even if other states were
to follow California's lead, it might be difficult to identify which ques-
tions go too far.
Many current tests include questions which may be viewed as in-
quiring into applicants' political views toward police, drugs, or corporate
America. Questions such as "You feel disgusted with the law when a
criminal gets off because of some legal technicality" and "There should
be a lot more police to control the high crime rate" are arguably polit-
ical. 113 However, a court deciding legality based on the types of ques-
tions asked would accomplish little, because publishers would merely
revise the questions. Trying to regulate the entire genre of integrity tests
through case-by-case battles over different types of questions is ineffi-
cient and fails to address other policy issues advanced by opponents of
integrity testing.
B. RECOMMENDATION AGAINST A PRESUMPTIVE BAN ON INTEGRITY
TESTS
The broad policy issues involving the fairness of the testing and the
appropriate balance between employer and employee interests might best
be left to legislatures which can examine all available information and
evidence. Two state legislatures were persuaded by arguments against
113 PSE SELECTION INVENToRY, Form #10163, Personnel Decision, Inc., 1994.
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integrity testing and included them in their states' bans on lie detector
tests. 114 Other states may follow suit, or the federal government may
likewise decide to include integrity tests in the national polygraph ban.
Alternatively, legislatures could choose to treat integrity tests as distinct
from the polygraph and enact legislation that would address the particu-
lar problems posed by integrity tests.
This option would definitely aid in certainty. Publishers could not
market the tests and employers could not use them. However, if the crux
of this policy debate centers on the lack of information, this solution has
no more support than the policy of non-action. It would simply be legis-
lation favoring employees against employers, rather than a balanced de-
cision either for or against the use of integrity tests.
C. RECOMMENDED EMPLOYER NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Federal or state legislation could require that any integrity test that
lacks extensive independent verification must provide notice to the em-
ployer that states that the tests have not been proved to measure honesty
or reduce theft. The notice could also warn that the test may be over
inclusive and misclassify honest people as dishonest. Such notice would
infonn the employer that the claims of the publisher have been verified
by no one other than the publisher itself. The market for the tests may
well be based on a misperception of what they can accomplish. The
disclaimer would enable the employer to make an informed decision re-
garding the investment into testing services. Information about the test's
limitations would allow employers to balance the costs versus the bene-
fits of the test. Market forces might operate to effectively curtail or elim-
inate the tests if employers question their efficacy.
If the tests are as effective as the publishers maintain, the publishers
would then have an incentive to conduct independent validation studies
in order to avoid this notice requirement. This way the current unin-
formed presumption that tests are valid is not reversed in favor of another
uninformed presumption. Rather, employers would be on notice and
have an incentive to encourage the gathering and dissemination of much
needed information regarding integrity tests.
D. RECOMMENDED TEST-TAKER NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
State or federal legislation could be enacted that would require noti-
fication of all integrity test-takers of (1) the purpose of the test, which is
to determine the takers' propensity to be dishonest, (2) the employer's
use of the test, which is to eliminate individuals identified as dishonest,
and (3) the fact that the results will not be revealed to the test-taker. This
114 See supra note 30.
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notice would inform the applicant that his honesty is being evaluated and
provide an opportunity to decline to take the test. The integrity test pro-
cess has seldom been challenged in court because the applicants are gen-
erally unaware of the test's use and purpose in the hiring process. The
two leading cases, Soroka and Borg-Warner, would not have gone to
trial had the test-takers not had access to information regarding the re-
sults and the use of their tests.
E. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATIVE BURDEN SHIFrING DEVICES
The United States Congress could shift the burden of proof from
requiring the employee to prove that the tests are invasive to requiring
that the employer or publisher prove that the tests are job-related and
non-discriminatory. The government could place a national moratorium
on integrity test use until the publishers/employers with independently
verifiable studies in hand can affirmatively persuade Congress that the
tests are free from the many unresolved concerns surrounding their use.
F. RECOMMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN SHIFTING DEVICES
Administrative regulation offers a less drastic measure of control.
Regulations could require that publishers register their tests. Employers
could only use tests that met certain government standards. This rule
could serve both as a check against tests which have no independent or
persuasive validation and as a check against tests which may identify
class characteristics as dishonest traits.
Under this approach, the government could effectively regulate in-
tegrity test use by employers. The government might administer licenses
to employers permitting the use of the test. Guidelines could be set up
regarding the scoring and weighting of test results. Employers could be
required to keep records to monitor test-takers who are members of pro-
tected classes. The government could also establish safeguards protect-
ing the confidentiality of test results.
This solution would involve a great deal of red tape, but it would
have the advantage of protecting employees and of allowing employers
who complied with the regulations to use the approved tests. The infor-
mation used to register the tests and to demonstrate compliance with the
guidelines could be gathered, providing detailed information on test re-
sults. With this information, the government could develop future integ-
rity test policies.
G. RECOMMENDED JUDICIAL BURDEN SHIFTING DEVICES
If Congress is committed to a more individual and judicial oriented
approach, the courts should use a burden shifting device similar to that
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used in Title VII claims. 115 When a plaintiff claims that a defendant
misused an integrity test, the defendant should put forth evidence that the
test's use was proper. Specifically, the employer must show that the
test's use was job-related and that the test was not used in a discrimina-
tory manner. This would allow plaintiffs to advance more easily to the
merits of their cases and challenge the tests within the judicial system.
CONCLUSION
Employers and employees have different interests to protect. Employers
would naturally like to know everything possible about prospective em-
ployees, especially information about what they are like when not at
work. Employers consider relevant any information that will help them
select the best workers out of a large applicant pool. Employees' reac-
tion to employers' search for personal information is generally that their
private lives are none of the employers' business.
Neither extreme view is helpful. A world where employers cannot
determine whether applicants for an accounting position have been con-
victed of embezzlement or applicants for a day care center have been
found guilty of child molestation is a world which would unreasonably
leave employers liable for employee actions that should have been pre-
vented. Conversely, a world which sanctions unlimited investigation
into workers' private lives would provide no privacy protection and al-
low employers to make arbitrary assumptions about employees based on
events completely outside the scope of work.
The solution appears to be somewhere in the middle. A process that
meets the real need of the employer for information that is useful and
job-related must be balanced against any violation of the employee's
legal rights. Unfortunately, in the integrity test context, thoughtful anal-
ysis is frustrated by a lack of reliable information concerning both the
benefits and the disadvantages of test use. Any policy regarding these
tests must take into account the lack of information available to substan-
tiate the benefits or harms of the tests.
The prospect of a test that can weed out dishonest workers is ap-
pealing. However, if employers accept this promise too readily, both
employers and employees may suffer. Employers may be lulled into a
false sense of security; employees may be discriminated against unfairly.
The only certain winners are the test publishers. Employers, employees,
courts, and legislators should be wary of accepting publishers' assur-
ances that the tests are valid. A public policy is needed to encourage
115 For an explanation of the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden shifting approach in
Title VII cases, see Black, supra note 10, at 107-08.
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independent validation of these tests and more employer/employee infor-
mation on their potential uses and abuses.
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